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Abstract. David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he 
calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on 
trying to show that its implications are less severe than appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that 
Lewis’ argument is unsound. I show that it rests on an essential assumption that can be 
straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to which Lewis is himself committed. 
 
1. Introduction 
David Lewis (Lewis, 1988, 1996) describes, then attempts to refute, an anti-
Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’ (DAB). I will call Lewis’ 
argument against DAB the ‘updating argument’. The implications of the updating 
argument are often held to extend far beyond disputes over the nature of desire. For 
example, Graham Oddie says it constitutes ‘a massive problem for realism about 
value’ (1994, p. 453), while Ruth Weintraub says it ‘entails subjectivism about ethics’ 
(2007, p. 119).  
In this paper I show that the updating argument rests on an essential 
assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to 
which Lewis is explicitly committed and which are central to the updating argument 
itself. My position, in other words, is that in constructing the updating argument 
Lewis implicitly contradicts himself. 
The error I identify in the updating argument appears to have gone unnoticed 
by the updating argument’s many other critics. These critics have, with a few 
exceptions, accepted the updating argument as sound, and focused instead on trying to 
show that its soundness can be tolerated. A common tack has been to contend that 
DAB is not in any case a plausible or attractive (or even, perhaps, coherent) version of 
anti-Humeanism, and then argue (or at least suggest) that certain more plausible 
versions of anti-Humeanism are invulnerable to the updating argument (Broome, 
1991; Byrne & Hájek, 1997; Daskal, 2010; Hájek & Pettit, 2004; Price, 1989; 
Weintraub, 2007). This approach has the weakness that, while it might provide 
comfort to the anti-Humean, it does nothing to dispel the threats posed by the 
updating argument to value-realism and objectivism in ethics. The present paper 
disposes of all such threats. 
§2 describes DAB. §3 outlines the updating argument. §4 exposes the error in 








Following Lewis (Lewis, 1988, 1996), let ‘A°’ (pronounced ‘A halo’) denote 
the claim that A’s being true is good. Harmlessly simplifying (although c.f. (Oddie, 
2001)), Lewis ignores degrees of goodness, and in the interests of generality he 
doesn’t specify what A’s being good consists in (instead leaving one free to plug in 
whichever analysis of goodness one wants). Let V(A) denote the degree to which a 
rational agent values A being the case. Let C(p) denote a rational agent’s credence for 
p’s being true. DAB is the following claim:  
 
DAB:   V(A)=C(A°) 
 
That is, DAB is simply the idea that the value assigned by a rational agent to 
some proposition A, and thus the extent to which she desires that A, is identical to her 
credence for A being good.i  DAB is ‘anti-Humean’ in the sense that it entails a 
rational agent’s desires logically supervene on her beliefs about what is good: i.e., that 
her desires and beliefs are not modally separable ‘distinct existences’.  
In the above formula, A is intended by Lewis to be a universally quantified 
variable ranging over all propositions. Following Lewis I leave this implicit, omitting 
the quantifier. For simplicity I continue to suppress quantifiers until near the end of 
the paper. 
  
3. Lewis’ updating argument  
The updating argument (Lewis, 1988, 1996) involves the following two 
claims: 
 
INV:  V(A|A)=V(A)  
X:   V(A|A)=C(A°|A) 
 
INV says, in effect, that the value a rational agent assigns to a proposition, A, 
being true will not be affected by her learning that A is indeed true. Lewis provides a 
detailed argument for INV (1988, pp. 331–332). Recently, several authors have 
argued that INV is false (Bradley & List, 2009; Bradley & Stefánsson, 2016; 
Stefánsson, 2014). But here I will assume that INV is true, and show that there is a 
problem elsewhere in Lewis’ argument.  
X is clearly a claim that a proponent of DAB must accept: for if a rational 
agent has learnt that A obtains, then her credence for A being good, and thus—
according to DAB—the degree to which she values A, will be updated by 
conditionalization on A. This is what X says. 
DAB, INV and X together entail IND: 
 
IND:   C(A°|A)=C(A°) 
 
Thus a proponent of DAB must accept IND. However suppose an agent’s 





Figure 1. An agent’s credence function for A, A°  and their negations. 
Suppose that the agent learns (say) that (AÚA°) is the case, and updates her 
credences accordingly. Let’s call her updated credence function, C¢. By the rules of 
Bayesian updating, C¢ is obtained by taking the credence represented by the shaded 
region of Figure 1 and redistributing it to the remaining regions so as to leave the 
relative sizes of these remaining regions unchanged. When this is done the A°-region 
grows in size. Thus C¢(A°)>C(A°). On the other hand, the proportion of the A-region 
which overlaps with the A°-region doesn’t change. Thus C¢(A°|A)=C(A°|A). When 








Notice that this means the agent’s updated credence function, C¢, does not 
conform to IND. And so even if an agent starts off using a credence function which 
satisfies IND, this property—of satisfying IND—will be unstable under Bayesian 
updating. It will, for instance, be lost as soon as the agent learns that (AÚA°) is the 
case and updates her credences accordingly. A proponent of DAB must—Lewis 
says—therefore deny that credences are to be adjusted by Bayesian updating. 
However Lewis insists, reasonably enough, that given the choice of repudiating DAB 
or repudiating Bayesian updating, we should repudiate the former, not the latter (1988, 
p. 325). 
 
4. The error in Lewis’ reasoning 
My refutation of Lewis’ updating argument has two steps. First I prove that a 
result I call the ‘conditionalization conjecture’ (CC) must be true if DAB is true. Next 
I show that if CC is true, then Lewis’ updating argument is unsound. 
Suppose that A∧A° is true—which is to say that A is true, and that A is good. 
Then it follows, obviously, that a good state of affairs obtains. Let this proposition, 
that a good state of affairs obtains, be called H (for ‘halo’). This being so, H° says it 
would be good that a good state of affairs obtains, which is a trivial truth. On the other 
hand, (¬H)° says it would be good that a good state of affairs does not obtain, which 
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is a trivial falsehood. A rational agent will therefore assign a credence of 1 to H°, and 
a credence of 0 to (¬H)°. These results are recorded as follows:  
 
C(H°)=1        (1) 
C((¬H)°)=0        (2) 
 
If we assume DAB, then from (1) and (2) we can derive (3) and (4): 
 
V(H)=1        (3) 
V(¬H)=0        (4) 
 
According to Lewis (1988, p. 326, 1996, p. 303), the values assigned to 
outcomes by a rational agent will obey a principle of additivity, which he 
characterises as follows: ‘the value of a proposition that might come true in several 
alternative ways is an average of the values of those several alternatives, weighted by 
their conditional credences’ (1988, p. 326). In symbols: 
 
V(X)=åi(V(XÙEi)C(Ei|X))      (5) 
 
Here X denotes any given proposition, and {E1,…} denotes any given set of 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions (i.e., any ‘partition’ of 
possibility space).  
Now, let T represent some obvious tautology (say, ‘1=1’). Consider the 
partition {A, ¬A}, where A is some arbitrary proposition. Substituting T for X and {A, 
¬A} for {E1, …} within (5) gives (6): 
 
V(T)=V(TÙA)C(A|T) + V(TÙ¬A)C(¬A|T)    (6) 
 
When (6) is simplified in light of T being a tautology (and hence a necessary 
truth), it turns into (7): 
 
V(T)=V(A)C(A)+V(¬A)C(¬A)     (7) 
 
Now, let’s suppose the arbitrary selected proposition, A, that is mentioned in 
(7) is in fact identical to H. (7) then becomes (8): 
 
V(T)=V(H)C(H)+V(¬H)C(¬H)     (8) 
 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (8) yields (9): 
 
V(T)=C(H)        (9) 
 
Substituting (9) back into (7) gives us (10): 
 
C(H)=V(A)C(A)+V(¬A)C(¬A)     (9) 
 
Conditionalizing on A (and thus setting C(A)=1 and C(¬A)=0) we obtain (10): 
 




Assuming again that DAB is true, we can derive CC from (10):  
 
CC:  C(A°)=C(H|A) 
 
CC says that, for any proposition A, the credence that an agent assigns to A° is 
identical to the conditional credence she assigns to there being a good outcome given 
that A comes true. Notice that CC implies that C(A°) is not an unconditional credence 
(as surface appearances suggest), but that it is instead a disguised conditional 
credence—namely, the conditional credence of H given A. 
So much for why, if DAB is true, CC must be true. I now explain why, if CC 
is true, then Lewis’s updating argument against DAB rests on an illegitimate 
assumption.  
As already explained, the updating argument rests on the assumption that 
credences are distributed as in Figure 1, with one ‘dollop’ of credence being assigned 
to A, another, overlapping ‘dollop’ of credence being assigned to A°, and the 
conditional credence assigned to (A°|A) being represented by the proportion of the A-
region which overlaps with the A°-region. If credences are distributed in this way then 
Lewis is quite right: Bayesian updating can in this case potentially change how much 
credence is assigned to A° without causing any corresponding change to how much 
conditional credence is assigned to (A°|A) (or vice versa)—with the result that IND 
will not be robustly satisfied.  
However, if CC is true then Figure 1 misrepresents the logical relationship 
between A and A°. Whereas Figure 1 represents A and A° as being logically 
independent propositions, CC implies that they are not independent, and that A° is 
instead a conditional proposition, conditioned on A. If CC is true then a rational 
agent’s credences must be distributed, not as they are in Figure 1, but rather as they 
are in Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2. How credences should be assigned by a rational agent. 
 
In Figure 2 one ‘dollop’ of credence is assigned to H, and another to A. The 
amount of credence assigned to A°, C(A°), is identified with C(H|A), and thus with the 
proportion of A-region that overlaps with the H-region—or, that is, with the 
proportion of the shaded region that is crosshatched.  
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Now, notice two points. First, under this way of allocating credences, C(A°) is 
a conditional credence, and it is conditioned on A (for it is the conditional credence of 
H given A). Second, it is a universal rule that if a credence function is already 
conditioned on a certain outcome, then updating it by conditionalizing it on the same 
outcome again has no effect. (That is, for any two credence functions P and Q, if 
P(x)=Q(x|a)—i.e., if P is already conditioned on a—then P(x|a)=P(x)—i.e., 
conditionalizing P on a again changes nothing.) Putting these two points together, it 
follows that C(A°|A)=C(A°) (for, since A° is already conditioned on A, conditioning 
on A again has no effect). Thus it follows that C(A°|A) will be represented in Figure 2 
in exactly the same way that C(A°) is represented—namely, by the proportion of the 
shaded region that is crosshatched. Since C(A°) and C(A°|A) are, for this reason, 
necessarily identical, it is impossible for Bayesian updating to produce any mismatch 
between them. That is, not only are C(A°) and C(A°|A) both represented in Figure 2 
by the proportion of the shaded region that is crosshatched, but they will both continue 
to be represented by this single element of the diagram even as the various regions in 
Figure 2 grow and shrink when forces of Bayesian updating operating upon them. 
Since C(A°) and C(A°|A) must, for this reason, always be identical, IND will always 
be satisfied. 
Let’s take stock. Lewis’ updating argument against DAB allegedly proves that 
no credence function can robustly satisfy IND in the face of Bayesian updating. 
However, the updating argument assumes that credences are distributed as per Figure 
1. I have shown that if DAB is true, then CC is true, and that if CC is true, then 
credences must instead be distributed as per Figure 2. Under this way of distributing 
credences, IND is necessarily satisfied. And so, in arguing against DAB, Lewis begs 
the question against DAB, by making an assumption that is inconsistent with the truth 
of DAB. The updating argument is unsound for this reason.   
 
5. How might Lewis respond? 
CC tells us that for any credence function, C, and proposition, A, 
C(A°)=C(H|A). The implication is that the halo function, °, is a propositional function 
that accepts a proposition, p, as input, and produces another proposition, p°, as output, 
such that a rational agent’s credence for p° should always match her conditional 
credence for H, given p. But is a propositional function that meets these specifications 
even logically possible in the first place? We need look no further than some of David 
Lewis’s own earlier work in order to find an argument that purports to show that such 
a function is not logically possible.ii In his (1976, 1986) Lewis aims to demonstrate 
that there can be no systematic way of mapping a pair of propositions, q and r, onto a 
proposition, s, such that C(s) should match C(q|r). Lewis might respond to my 
demonstration that DAB entails CC by harking back to this earlier work. Specifically, 
he could argue that if DAB entails CC, then it follows from his earlier work that the 
halo function cannot exist, and thus that DAB is incoherent (because it posits the halo 
function). 
Although Lewis could respond in this way, there are two points to notice. First, 
although this would still give Lewis an argument against DAB, it would be a different 
argument than the one he in fact uses, the updating argument, which I have shown to 
be unsound. Second, it is controversial whether Lewis’ earlier results are correct (see, 
e.g., Edgington, 2014; Milne, 1997). Hence they provide an insecure foundations for a 
revised argument against DAB.iii   
Another reply Lewis might make to my rebuttal of his updating argument can 
be guessed based on his response to a related argument by Huw Price. Price (1989) 
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shows that Lewis’ updating argument can’t be used to refute the following anti-
Humean rival to DAB, which Lewis (1996) calls ‘Desire as Conditional Belief’ 
(DACB): 
 
DACB:  V(A)=C(A°|A) 
 
Lewis’ (1996) response to Price is rather involved. Here is my reconstruction 
of it. Lewis begins by, in effect, distinguishing two claims to which the Humean is 
committed: 
 
H1. Facts about what a rational agent desires are not fixed or determined by facts 
about what she believes.  
H2.  Agents that are alike in being rational, that have the same priors, and that are 
privy to the same empirical data about the world, can potentially be unalike in 
what they value and desire.  
 
He then distinguishes two versions of anti-Humeanism, which I will call 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’.iv The strong anti-Humean denies both H1 and H2, while the 
weak anti-Humean denies only H1. Lewis represents the strong anti-Humean’s claim 
as follows: 
 
DBN:   V(A)=C(G|A) 
 
Here G amounts to the proposition that something objectively good happens 
(1996, p. 307). Since DBN is intended to express strong anti-Humeanism, it should 
contradict both H1 and H2, and indeed it does. It contradicts H1 because it implies 
that facts about what a rational agent values, and thus desires, are fixed by her 
credences, and hence by her beliefs. It contradicts H2 because it implies that rational 
agents are all alike in having desires geared toward the same ultimate, objective good, 
embodied by G.   
Lewis is surprisingly non-hostile to strong anti-Humeanism as encapsulated in 
DBN. He says little about it—only that it is a ‘comparatively simple and 
unproblematic version’ of anti-Humeanism (1996, 307). He makes no attempt to 
refute it. His lack of interest in refuting strong anti-Humeanism is presumably to be 
explained in terms of his being a sufficiently committed Humean to think strong anti-
Humeanism has no real chance of being true (due to its radical denial of H2). Weak 
anti-Humeanism poses a much more credible threat to Humeanism.   
Lewis proceeds to critique various possible formulations of weak anti-
Humeanism, including both his own DAB and Price’s DACB. As we have seen, he 
holds that DAB is untenable because it falls prey to the updating argument. His 
response to Price, in contrast, is that DACB turns out, upon analysis, to be re-
expressible as DBN.  His complaint against DACB is therefore that it is not a version 
of weak anti-Humeanism after all. It is just strong anti-Humeanism in disguise. In 
Lewis’ words, DACB is ‘a form of anti-Humeanism, sure enough, but not the right 
form of anti-Humeanism’ (1996, p. 313). 
Now, in my above rebuttal of the updating argument I showed that CC is true, 
and when DAB and CC are put together they entail a theory strikingly similar to DBN. 
(More on this shortly.) This being so, Lewis might reply to me much as he replies to 
Price. Specifically, he might contend that I have rescued DAB from the jaws of the 
updating argument only by showing that DAB amounts to a form, not of weak anti-
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Humeanism, but of DBN, and thus of strong anti-Humeanism. In other words, Lewis 
might, while conceding that I have refuted his updating argument (a major concession 
on his part), claim that I have nevertheless played into his hands by providing an 
alternative proof of the result he is after: viz., that DAB is not a tenable form of weak 
anti-Humeanism. 
My counter-reply to this potential reply of Lewis’ is to deny that DAB and CC 
together entail a form of strong anti-Humeanism. (I believe Price could respond 
similarly with regards DACB.)  
DAB and CC together entail a theory I will call ‘DAB+’: 
 
DAB:   V(A)=C(A°) 
CC:  C(A°)=C(H|A) 
DAB+:  V(A)=C(H|A) 
 
DAB+ and DBN certainly appear to be very similar theories. Indeed, they 
appear to share precisely the same logical form, with the only difference between 
them being that where DAB+ references H, DBN instead references G. But this 
apparent similarity is, I will now show, merely superficial. When quantifiers are 
brought into the open, the two views are exposed as having different logical forms. 
To see this, let’s start with DAB. Lewis proposes DAB as a formulation of 
weak, rather than strong, anti-Humeanism. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it, 
since DAB says simply that V(A)=C(A°), DAB would seem to imply that if two 
rational agents share all the same beliefs, and thus assign the same credences to all 
propositions, then they will necessarily share the same values, and so share the same 
desires. Thus DAB would appear to be inconsistent with the possibility of a pair of 
equally well-informed rational agents with the same priors diverging in what they 
desire. If this were right then DAB would entail the falsity of H2 as well as the falsity 
of H1, and so it would be a form of strong anti-Humeanism, not of weak anti-
Humeanism. The solution to this puzzle lies in recognizing that the halo function is 
intended by Lewis to be agent-relative. Different rational agents can potentially have 
different halo functions. That is, it can potentially be the case that for one agent, A°=P, 
while for a second agent, A°=Q, where P and Q are different propositions. If these 
two agents share all the same beliefs then they will agree in the credences they assign 
to P and Q respectively. But they will nevertheless differ in how much they value, and 
thus desire, A’s being the case, for where the first agent is concerned, 
V(A)=C(A°)=C(P), while for the second agent, V(A)=C(A°)=C(Q).  
Recall that H is characterized by reference to the halo function (since H is 
defined such that (1) and (2) come out as true). This being so, it follows from the fact 
that Lewis’ halo function is agent-relative that H will be agent-relative too. With this 
in mind, consider the following two rival ways in which DAB+ might be formulated 
when quantifiers are brought into the open: 
 
DAB+1:  ∃H∀x∀A: Vx(A)=Cx(H|A) 
DAB+2:  ∀x∃H∀A: Vx(A)=Cx(H|A) 
 
Here Vx(A) denotes the value assigned by a rational agent, x, to an outcome, A.  
Similarly, Cx denotes the credence function used by x. Notice that, because of where 
the existential quantifier is positioned, DBN+1 implies that there is a single 
proposition, H, which serves as a universal ‘yardstick’ against which every rational 
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agent measures the values of outcomes. On the other hand, DBN+2 is consistent with 
the possibility of different agents using different versions of H as their respective 
yardsticks for measuring value. Clearly the idea that the halo function, and thus the 
identity of H, can vary between rational agents is correctly captured by DBN+2, but 
not by DBN+1. We should therefore understand DBN+ as being equivalent to DBN+2, 
not as being equivalent to DBN+1. 
Let’s now turn to DBN, two rival formulations of which are as follows: 
 
DBN1:  ∃G∀x∀A:  Vx(A)=Cx(G|A) 
DBN2:  ∀x∃G∀A:  Vx(A)=Cx(G|A) 
 
DBN is, of course, intended by Lewis to encapsulate strong anti-Humeanism, 
with the idea being that G represents an objective good, that is the same for all 
rational agents and cannot vary between rational agents. This being so, it is obvious 
that DBN is to be correctly understood as saying the same thing as DBN1, not DBN2. 
Thus when quantifiers are brought into the open DAB+ is revealed as being 
equivalent to DAB+2, while DBN is revealed as being equivalent to DBN1. Crucially, 
DAB+2 and DBN1 do not share the same logical form. Hence, initial appearance to 
the contrary notwithstanding, DAB+ and DBN do not share the same logical form 
either. They appear to share the same logical form only because of a scope ambiguity. 
When this ambiguity is resolved by bringing quantifiers into the open, it becomes 
clear that DAB+ is consistent with rational agents differing among each other in what 
they ultimately value, as per weak anti-Humeanism, while DBN instead entails that 
rational agents must be alike in what they ultimately value, as per strong anti-
Humeanism. The potential objection here being considered—that by showing DAB 
entails DAB+ I have shown DAB to be a form of strong anti-Humeanism—is thus 
without foundation.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Lewis’ updating argument is, I believe, decisively refuted by the above proof 
of CC. If this is right then anti-Humeans (weak anti-Humeans included), value-realists, 
and objectivists about ethics have nothing to fear at least where this particular threat 
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i Although DAB is intended as a theory of desire, Lewis casts it in terms of the V 
operator, and thus in terms of what the agent values. His tacit assumption is that an 
agent desires a given state of affairs just to the degree she values it. If this assumption 
appears dubious then it can simply be stipulated that V(A) denotes strength of desire, 
rather than level of valuing. 
ii Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this work of Lewis’. 
iii My own view is that Lewis’ (1976) result is definitely erroneous, but I will defend 
this claim elsewhere. 
iv Lewis (1996) instead calls these positions ‘Desire by Necessity’ and ‘Desire as 
Belief’. However, these terms are ambiguous since he uses them both as names of the 
two anti-Humean positions in question and as the names of formula that purportedly 
express these anti-Humean positions. Moreover, the terms are not especially clear—
so I don’t use them. 
